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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature on the innovation effect of social trust by analyzing the 
mechanisms linking social trust and R&D Investments. High social trust level can ease firms’ 
credit constraints by reducing moral hazards and information asymmetries problems which make 
raising external capital difficult and expensive for firms. It can also reduce relational risks that 
expose firms to ex-post holdup or outright intellectual property expropriation. Using data from 20 
OECD countries, I test these mechanisms by evaluating whether more external finance dependent 
and relational risks vulnerable sectors exhibit disproportional higher R&D investments in countries 
with high social trust level. The empirical results confirm that high social trust level encourages 
investments in R&D. Importantly, the results indicate that sectors which depend more on external 
finance and those sectors that are more vulnerable to relational risks experience a relatively greater 
increase in R&D investments in countries with high social trust. The results underline access to 
external credit and reduction in relational risks as causal pathways linking social trust and R&D 
investment. 
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1. Introduction 
Innovation activities such as investment in Research and Development (R&D) has been identified 
as an important determinant of income per capita and long-run productivity growth (Romer, 1990; 
Grossman & Helpman, 1991; Aghion & Howitt, 1992). Therefore, understanding the drivers of 
innovation activities is a relevant policy question. Relatedly, the relationship between social 
capital, particularly social trust, and innovation activities has been gaining increasing interest in 
the literature (Dakhli & De Clercq, 2004; Akҫomak & ter Weel, 2009; Kaasa, 2009; Doc & Acs, 
2010; Akҫomak & Müller-Zick, 2018; Thompson, 2018; Xie et al., 2019). However, while existing 
studies document a positive association between social trust level and innovation activities, little 
empirical evidence exists on the exact mechanisms through which social trust affects innovation 
activities. Using industry-level data on R&D investments in 20 OECD countries over the period 
spanning 1990-2008, this paper is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
Specifically, this paper identifies and empirically test two causal mechanisms, easing credit access 
and reduction in relational risks, which directly link social trust and R&D investments. These 
mechanisms build on the well-established literature suggesting that access to credit and effective 
contract enforcement, which are relational risks reducing, incentivize R&D investments (Brown 
et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2012; Agénor et al., 2014; Khanna & Mathews, 2016; Seitz & 
Watzinger, 2017; Fang et al., 2017). On the one hand, R&D investment is a cost-intensive activity 
often requiring external financing because R&D investing firms easily exhaust their internal 
funds.1 On the other hand, investments in R&D, say, in new product development often require 
collaboration with multiple parties or making relationship specific-investments. This exposes the 
investing firm to ex-post holdup or outright intellectual property expropriation which can 
discourage investment in new product development. Accordingly, the causal mechanisms 
considered in this paper evaluate how high social trust level encourages investment in R&D by 
reducing firms’ external finance constraints and relational risks problems which can reduce 
research efforts.  
                                                             
1
 Related to this is the fact that R&D investment though a cost-intensive activity is characterized with huge uncertainty. 
Hence, sourcing external fund is one of the ways firms diversify risk. However, to protect their proprietary 
information, R&D investing firms may be unwilling to fully divulge all information concerning their R&D activities 
to credit lenders. This creates information asymmetry that further constrains R&D external financing. However, high 
social trust level, which can be thought as cultural values and social discipline against opportunistic tendencies, can 
dissipate firms concern over divulging their proprietary information. 
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Firstly, high social trust level can reallocate capital in the credit market by reducing moral hazards 
and adverse selection problems which make raising external capital difficult and expensive for 
firms. The intuition is that in a high trusting society, being opportunistic (i.e. moral hazard) would 
go contrary to the society’s ingrained moral values and it usually attracts social sanctions and 
stigmas. Therefore, borrowers in such a society would have a lower likelihood of default as they 
are bounded by high moral standards, while credit lenders would be more willing to lend to 
borrowers from such a society because of a reduced concern over default risks. High social trust 
level can also expand credit access by reducing information asymmetries between borrowers and 
credit lenders (i.e. adverse selection). Pevzner et al. (2015) argue that firms in high trusting 
societies are less likely to manipulate their financial results. Consequently, investors perceive their 
financial reports as more credible and are more likely to invest in firms from such a society. The 
foregoing arguments are consistent with plethora of studies that indicate high social trust level 
increases firms’ access to external capital (Duarte et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2016; 
Bottazi et al., 2016; Levine et al., 2018) or the supply of bank credit (Guiso et al., 2004; Cruz-
García & Peiró-Palomino, 2019). 
 
Secondly, social trust as an informal institution mitigates relational risks that may lead to 
underinvestment in new research projects. Seitz & Watzinger (2017) argue that when active 
markets for inputs do not exist or firms are unable to write enforceable contracts with input 
suppliers, firms might be unwilling to invest in the development of a new product if a supplier 
delivering an essential input can ex-post extract all the rents resulting from a successful research 
effort. While they centred their argument around formal contract enforcement, the conventional 
view is that informal institutions such as trust is an integral part of a country’s overall contracting 
environment and it either complements or substitutes formal contract enforcement mechanisms 
where governments are either unable or unwilling to provide one (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Guiso 
et al., 2004; Mccannon et al., 2017). In which case, the social trust offers similar gains as formal 
contract enforcement. This conclusion is in line with studies suggesting that high social trust level 
encourages economic activities by reducing opportunistic behaviours (Lyons & Mehta, 1997; Dyer 
& Chu, 2003; Wang et al., 2011). 
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To evaluate the above mechanisms, I exploit cross-industry variations on the extent of external 
finance dependence and exposure to relational risks which may suggest the relative dependence of 
an industry on social trust level. The identification assumptions are then as follows. First, because 
high social trust level is generally thought to reduce moral hazards and adverse selection problems 
that impede firms’ access to external credit, high trust level should disproportionately benefit firms 
that are more dependent on external finance to fund R&D investments once other factors are 
controlled for. Secondly, because high trust level reduces relational risks, high trust level should 
disproportionately benefit firms that are more vulnerable to relational risks once other factors are 
controlled for. Hence, this paper evaluates whether more external finance dependent and relational 
risk vulnerable industries experience higher R&D investments in countries with high social trust 
level compared with those industries in countries with low social trust level. 
 
I test this hypothesis using the empirical approach developed by Rajan & Zingales (1998). The 
approach tests the hypothesis by simply examining how the interaction of country-specific 
indicator of social trust level and industry-specific indicator external finance dependence on the 
one hand, and relational risks, on the other hand, affects industry R&D investments. As an 
empirical measure of industry R&D investment, I use the ratio of R&D expenditure to value-
added. Following the existing literature (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Wu et al., 2014; Pevzner et al., 
2015; Chen et al., 2016; Bottazi et al., 2016; Levine et al., 2018), I measure social trust level as 
the proportion of a country’s population in a year that “agrees” with the statement in the World 
Value Survey: “Most people can be trusted”. External finance dependence is measured using the 
industries’ finance dependence originally computed by Rajan & Zingales (1998). The index 
measures for each industry, the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from 
operations. Because firms in these industries depend more on external finance to fund their 
activities, they are more prone to financial frictions in the credit market.   Lastly, I proxy industries’ 
vulnerability to relational risks using Nunn (2007) “contract intensity index”. The index measures 
for each industry, the proportion of intermediate inputs which are not traded on active markets. 
Because these goods are not traded on active markets, the require relation specific investments to 
be made, thereby exposing the R&D investing firm to relational risks. 
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The result from the empirical analysis confirms that high social trust level increases investments 
in R&D. Exploring the causal mechanisms through which social trust intensifies R&D efforts, the 
results are consistent with my hypothesis that more external finance dependent and relational risks 
vulnerable industries exhibit disproportional higher R&D investments in countries with high social 
trust level. This result is robust to a number of robustness checks. Calculating the sizes of the effect 
of either of the causal mechanisms shows a sizeable impact. For instance, the results suggest a one 
standard deviation expansion in the social trust level will increase R&D investment intensities by 
1.5 percentage point for an industry at the average external finance dependent and by 4.8 
percentage point for an industry at the average relational risk exposure. Either of these effects is 
greater than the sample average R&D investment intensity of 0.056, suggesting that the impact of 
social trust is substantial in economic terms. Given the essential role of R&D in determining 
income per capita and long-run productivity growth, the study underlines R&D as a possible 
pathway social trust affects economic growth, further divulging the causal mechanisms that link 
social trust and R&D investment. Accordingly, the findings of the paper beg the need for 
governments to identify the drivers of social trust and make concerted efforts toward investing in 
them. 
 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the innovation effect of social capital and trust 
by exploring the causal mechanisms on the trust-innovation nexus. In a closely related paper, Xie 
et al. (2019) regressed patent count and citations on social trust level interacted with industry patent 
intensity. Contrary to their study, the current paper focuses on R&D investment and how social 
trust, by easing firms’ external credit constraints and exposure to ex-post relational risks, 
intensifies research efforts. Both papers are therefore distinct on how they proxy innovation 
activity and identify the effect of social trust on the outcome variable. This paper is also related to 
the broader literature examining the relationship between social trust and economic activities or 
outcomes such as the level of human and physical capital investment (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak 
& Knack, 2001; Dearmon & Grier, 2011), productivity (Bjørnsko & Meòn, 2015), stock market 
performance and financial development (Guiso et al., 2004; 2008; Pelvzener et al., 2008), trade, 
FDI and Migration (Guiso et al., 2009; Spring & Grossmann, 2016), among others, but has ignored 
the effect of trust on R&D especially at the industry level. Relatedly, this paper also contributes to 
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the literature on the country level drivers of R&D investments (Wang, 2010; Becker, 2014; Alam 
et al., 2019) by evaluating for the first time in the literature the role of trust in this process.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the research methodology, 
specifying the empirical model and different data sources used in the analysis. Section 3 presents 
the empirical results, while Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Estimation Equation 
The four most important variables in my empirical analysis are R&D investment intensities, 
measures of industry external finance dependence and exposure to relational risks, and data on 
social trust level. R&D investment intensities are calculated as the ratio of industry R&D 
expenditure to value-added at the 2-digit International System Industry Classification Revision 
(ISIC Rev.) 3.1. Data on R&D expenditures come from the OECD’s Analytical Business 
Enterprise and Research (ANBERD) database, while data on industry value added comes from the 
OECD’s STAN database. Owing to many missing observations on industry R&D expenditures in 
many countries and the availability of data on industry finance dependence and relational risks, 
the analysis is restricted to an unbalanced panel comprising 21 manufacturing industries in 20 
countries over the period spanning 1990-2008. For the remaining few missing observations, I use 
linear interpolations to fill them up. The sample distribution of R&D investment intensities is 
described in Table 1A, 2A and 3A in the appendix.  
 
Data on industry external finance dependence and relational risks come from Maskus et al. (2019) 
and Seitz & Watzinger (2017), respectively. Both variables are calculated from US data. The 
variables are country and time-invariant, but varies across industries. Specifically, the industry 
external finance dependence was computed following the definition of Rajan & Zingale (1998): 
the ratio of capital expenditures less cash flow from operations for all publicly-listed U.S firms in 
the Compustat database over the periods 1990–1999. The value for the median firm in each 
industry is then taken as the industry’s external finance dependence value. By construction of this 
index, it follows that whilst firms with higher cash flow are able to use internal funds to finance 
capital expenditures including R&D, the same cannot be said about firms with lower cash flow 
which makes them depend more on external finance. Accordingly, because high social trust level 
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eases external credit constraints, firms will have the requisite capital to fund promising R&D 
projects. While this would be true across firms, it should apply more forcefully in more external 
finance dependent sectors and the marginal effects are also more likely to be stronger in those 
sectors given the greater efficiency of capital allocation. 
 
As an indicator of industry exposure to relational risks, I use Nunn (2007) contract dependence 
index which has been aggregated at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3.1 by Seitz & Watzinger (2017). The 
index measures for each industry, the proportion of intermediate inputs which are not traded on 
active markets.1 To compute the index, Seitz & Watzinger (2017) combines the 2002 United States 
Input-Output Use table (which provides information on the share of intermediate inputs used to 
produce a final good in 439 industries) with data on whether these intermediate inputs are 
reference-priced or sold through an organized exchange. They then aggregate the inputs at the 2-
digit ISIC Rev. 3.1 level. Because these inputs are not traded on active markets, they require 
producers to make relationship specific-investments which are relational risks increasing. Such 
risks include either exposure to ex-post holdup or outright expropriation of intellectual property. 
Table 4A in the appendix lists the industries together with the indicators on contract and finance 
dependence used in the empirical analysis. 
 
As it is obvious by now, the industry external finance dependence or relational risk vulnerability 
is not specific to the R&D intensity of the industry. Ideally, it would be better to use industry 
measure of external finance dependence that is specifically for expenditures related to R&D and 
relationship specific-investments that are directly targeted at R&D. While this is a limitation of 
this study, it does not compromise the main message of the paper because the indexes capture the 
overall industry external financial dependence and exposure to relational risks.2 Further, the 
indexes are not country-industry specific. Whilst this is due to the lack of comparable cross-
country data to compute such indexes, the empirical framework adopted in this paper treats the 
external finance dependence and relational risk vulnerability as a technological component of an 
industry. That is, it is for technological reasons that, say, the textile industry depends more on 
                                                             
2
 In the econometrics estimation, I also control for industry fixed effects and this should ideally reduce any 
measurement error induced on how the industry financial dependence and relational risks are computed. 
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external finance to fund its operation than the food products and beverages industry. In which case, 
what matters is only the ranking of industries along with these technological characteristics.  
 
Finally, for the social trust level, I use the perception-based trust indicator from the World Value 
Survey (WVS) which has become the standard trust indicator. It is measured as the proportion of 
a country’s population that “agrees” with the statement, “Most people can be trusted”. Different 
studies have employed this variable to evaluate the effect of informal institution on different 
socioeconomic outcomes (Zak & Knack, 2001; Roy et al., 2014). The variable is directly taken 
from the CANA Dataset (Castellacci & Natera, 2011).3 However, the original data comes from the 
WVS, a cross-country based survey data that is collected since 1981 albeit countries enter the 
survey at a different point in time. The sample distribution of R&D investment intensities is 
described in Table 1A, 2A and 3A in the appendix. 
 
In what follows, to test my hypothesis that more external finance dependent and relational risk 
vulnerable industries experience higher R&D investments in countries with high social trust level 
compared with those industries in countries with low social trust level, results based on estimating 
variations of the following equation will be presented: 
 𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑠 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑 ∗ 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠𝑖𝑡      (1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is R&D investment intensity in industry s in country i, 𝛿𝑠 is industry fixed effect. 𝛿𝑖 
and 𝛿𝑡 are country and year fixed effects, respectively. 𝑇𝑖𝑡 is a country measure of social trust level. 𝑥𝑠 is a measure of industry external finance dependence, while 𝑟𝑠 is a measure of industry exposure 
to relational risks. In the baseline regression, I follow Maskus et al. (2019) and control for the 
industry share in GDP computed as industry production divided by GDP. I also account for a 
country macroeconomic environment using the country inflation rate. Data on industry annual 
production comes from the OECD’s STAN database, while data on GDP and inflation rate come 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI). Based on the hypothesis, 𝛾 and 𝜑 are the 
parameters of interest and are expected to be positive and statistically significant at all time. On 
                                                             
3
 Castellacci and Natera (2011) use imputation methods to fill-in missing observations for different countries. We 
kindly refer the reader to the article for more detailed description about the data. 
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the one hand, a positive 𝛾 suggests that social trust does reduce credit market frictions thereby 
expanding firms access to external finance with which they can use to fund R&D. On the other 
hand, a positive 𝜑 suggests that social trust reduces potential relational risks which may reduce 
firms’ research efforts. This identification strategy builds on the seminal work of Rajan & Zingales 
(1998) that interacted industries’ indicator of external finance dependence with a national indicator 
of financial development to study the impact of financial development on the output growth of 
credit-constrained industries.  
 
In the robustness section, I further control for a number of variables. First, I control for the overall 
development of a country using its income per capita. Original data used to compute this indicator 
come from the Penn World Table version 9. To isolate the effect of social trust from formal 
contracting institutions, I use the rule of law index from the World Governance Indicator. Data on 
the variable is only available for a number of countries from 1996. Between the periods 1996-
2002, the data is only available on two years interval. To minimize missing observations in these 
periods, I take averages such that the observation in 1997 is the mean value between 1996 and 
1998.4 I also control for the level of patent rights protection in a country since R&D often yields 
intangible assets which are protected by patents. For this, I use the Ginarte & Park (1997) index. 
The index is available on five years interval for a number of countries beginning in 1960. To 
minimize losing observations, I extrapolate the observations such that the values, say, in 1990 is 
the same for 1991 until 1994 while the value in 1995 is the same for 1996 until 1999, and so on.5 
Maskus et al. (2019), among others, found that (formal) financial development matters decisively 
for R&D investment. Accordingly, I use the financial development index from the IMF database 
to proxy the overall financial development of a country. I also use it to isolate the effect of formal 
financing channel from informal financing channel. To further differentiate the differential effect 
of social trust in my analysis, I control for each country’s human and physical capital level. Data 
on both variables come the Penn World Table version 9.0. Finally, I isolate the effect of social 
trust in the credit and relational risks vulnerable industries from other industry characteristics by 
controlling for other industry characteristics such as skill and capital intensity, and asset tangibility. 
Data on these variables come from Seitz & Watzinger (2017) and Maskus et al. (2019). 
                                                             
4
 In an unreported result, I find that using this index with the missing observations do not change my conclusion. 
5
 In an unreported result, I find that using this index with the missing observations do not change my conclusion. 
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3. Empirical Results 
This section proceeds in two sub-sections. The first section presents the baseline regression results, 
whilst the second section presents the robustness checks on the baseline results. 
 
<<Insert Table 1>> 
 
3.1. Baseline Results 
Table 1 displays the baseline result on the effect of social trust level on R&D investment. The 
dependent variable for each reported regression in the table is industry R&D investment intensity. 
Before exploring the causal pathways through which social trust level affects investment in R&D, 
I first conduct a preliminary analysis by estimating the average effect of social trust level on R&D 
investments. Specifically, I regress industry R&D investment intensities on social trust level 
excluding the interaction terms comprising “social trust and industry external finance 
dependence”, and “social trust and industry relational risk vulnerability”. Column 1 shows the 
result. The coefficient estimate of social trust is positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent. 
The magnitude of the coefficient estimate in the column suggests that a one standard deviation 
expansion in social trust level will increase investment in R&D by 1.07 percentage points.  
 
This result is somewhat consistent with the extant literature which documents a positive 
association between social trust and innovation (Akҫomak & ter Weel, 2009; Kaasa, 2009; 
Akҫomak & Müller-Zick, 2018; Thompson, 2018). However, it extends the literature by providing 
first empirical evidence on the effect of social trust level on R&D investment, i.e. an innovation 
input activity, other than on innovation outcomes using the patent count that has been the focus of 
previous studies. Along this line, the result contributes to the broader literature examining how 
social trust affects the real sector (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001; Dearmon & Grier, 
2009; 2011). Specifically, this literature has examined the effect of social trust on productivity, 
and investments in physical and human capital. The result adds to this literature by underling 
investment in R&D as another pathway social trust affects the real sector. As retrospection, social 
trust can encourage investments in R&D by encouraging information exchange and collaboration, 
and reducing transaction costs, external financing constraints and opportunistic behaviours. 
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Next, Columns 3-5 show the results when I empirically test two of these casual mechanisms, access 
to external credit and reduction on relational risks, through which social trust can affect R&D 
investment. I begin by regressing industry R&D investment intensities on social trust level and its 
interaction with industry external finance dependence in Column 3 and exposure to relational risks 
in Column 4. In both cases, the coefficient estimates of 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 are positive and statistically 
significantly different from zero at all conventional level. These suggest that more external finance 
dependent and relational risks vulnerable industries experience a relatively faster increase in R&D 
investment in high trusting countries. In Column 5, I jointly include both interaction term variables 
in a single regression and find that the initial results still hold. Importantly, the respective estimated 
coefficients of the interaction term variables enter with the same statistical significance level and 
almost the same magnitude as when included one at a time. These suggest that the two interaction 
terms identify distinct economic mechanisms through which social trust level determines industry 
R&D investment intensities. On the one hand, the result on the interaction term comprising social 
trust and external finance dependence is consistent with my underlying argument that high social 
trust level reduces borrowers’ moral hazard and adverse selection problems which impede access 
to external credit. On the other hand, the result on the interaction term comprising social trust and 
industry relational risks vulnerability is consistent with my argument that social trust, as an integral 
part of contracting institutions, mitigates ex-post holdup or outright intellectual property 
expropriation that can discourage firms’ research efforts.  
 
The results are also economically meaningful. Based on the coefficient estimates of 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 in Column 4, a one standard deviation expansion in the social trust level will increase R&D 
investment intensities by 1.5 percentage point for an industry at the average external finance 
dependent (0.254) and by 4.8 percentage point for an industry at the average relational risk 
exposure (0.48). The sample’s cross country-industry average R&D investment intensity is 0.056 
percentage point while its maximum value is 4.548 percentage point. Therefore, both the 1.5 and 
4.8 percentage points increase in R&D investment intensities are substantial in economic terms. 
Taking into account the cross country variations in social trust level, the result further suggests 
that, investment in R&D for an industry with the average external finance dependence will increase 
by 2.16 per cent in a country with social trust level at the 75th percentile (0.417) compared to a 
country with social trust level at the 25th percentile (0.246). In the same way, investment in R&D 
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for an industry with average relational risk exposure will increase by 68.56 per cent in a country 
with social trust level at the 75th percentile compared to a country with generalized trust level at 
the 25th percentile. To provide further context, consider moving from a country at the 75th 
percentile of social trust level to a country at the 25th percentile. This will widen the gap in R&D 
investment intensities between the industries at the 25th (ISIC 21 – Paper and Paper Products) and 
75th (ISIC 32 – Radio, TV and Communication Equipment) percentiles of external finance 
dependence by 1.75 per cent. Similarly, it will also widen the gap in R&D investment intensities 
between the industries at the 25th (ISIC 18 – Wearing Apparel and Fur) and 75th (ISIC 33 – 
Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments, Watches and Clocks) percentiles of relational risk 
exposure by 5.86 per cent.  
 
Finally, Column 6 substitutes the industry fixed effect with the industry external finance 
dependence and industry relational risks vulnerability. As expected, both indexes are negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that industry credit constraints and relational risks vulnerability 
reduce investments in R&D. 
  
3.2. Robustness Checks 
The baseline result supports the hypothesis that “more external finance dependent and relational 
risk vulnerable industries experience higher R&D investments in countries with high social trust 
level compared with those industries in countries with low social trust level”. In this section, I 
subject my main result on causal mechanisms through which social trust affect R&D to different 
sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of the results. To conserve space, I only report coefficients 
that are reported in the baseline result.6  
 
<< Table 2>> 
 
3.2.1. Additional Control Variables  
                                                             
6
 In an unreported result, I perform two analysis. First, I log transform the dependent variable. Second, I define R&D 
intensity as the ratio of R&D expenditure to output. In both cases, the regression results are consistent with the baseline 
result. 
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As argued elsewhere (Rajan & Zingales 1998; Kroszner et al., 2007), the empirical approach 
adopted in this paper is less susceptible to omitted variables bias or model misspecification due to 
the battery of country, sector and year fixed effects that are controlled for. However, to ensure that 
the baseline result is not driven by other confounding factors, Table 2 displays the results when I 
account for additional control variables both at the country and industry level. Panel A emerges 
when I control for additional country-level variables. Column 1 controls for patent rights 
protection, financial development, and human capital, while Column 2 further controls for formal 
institutional quality using the rule of law index. Because of missing observation on some country’s 
patent right protection, the observation in Column 1 falls to 6172 from its previous value of 6214 
in Table 1. In addition, due to the lack of observations on the rule of law index between the periods 
1990-1995, the number of observations in Column 2 falls markedly to 4688 from its previous value 
of 6172 in Column 1. Notwithstanding these, the coefficient estimates of 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 are 
consistently positive and statistically different from zero in Column 1 and 2. The results are 
consistent with those reported in the baseline result, by suggesting that more external finance 
dependent and relational risk vulnerable industries experience higher R&D investment intensities 
in countries with high social trust level compared with those industries in countries with low social 
trust level.  
 
While the analysis so far focuses on industry external finance dependence and relational risks as 
two causal pathways social trust affects investments in R&D, it may well be that either of these 
characteristics correlates with other industry characteristics. If this is the case, the baseline result 
will be spurious. Accordingly, Panel B emerges when social trust indicator is interacted with other 
industry characteristics such as skill intensity (Column 3), Asset Tangibility (Column 4), and 
capital intensity (Column 5). These serve to isolate the causal impact of trust through the credit 
and relational risk channel from any other channel. Column 6 jointly controls for these additional 
industry characteristics. In all cases, the coefficient estimates of 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 are positive and 
statistically significant at one per cent. The results are thus in line with the baseline result.  
 
Finally, Panel C emerges when I use more stringent fixed effects to capture potential omitted time-
varying variables at the country and industry level. Column 8 replaces the country fixed effects 
with country-year fixed effects to control for country time-varying factors that may affect 
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investment in R&D, while Column 9 replaces the sector fixed effect with sector-year fixed effects 
to control for potential influences of time-varying industry factors on R&D investments. Column 
10 jointly controls for both time-varying country and industry fixed effects. In Columns 7-10, the 
coefficient estimates of 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 are positive and statistically significant at one per cent. The 
result is therefore consistent with the baseline results and conclusion.  
 
<<Table 3>> 
 
3.2.2. Is the effect of social trust distinct from other variables 
The social trust level in a country may capture other aspects of overall economic development and 
the quality of institutions more generally. To investigate whether the relationship I find is distinct 
from any other country or industry characteristics, I interact a variety of other country and industry 
characteristics with the industry external finance dependence and relational risks vulnerability 
indexes. The results for this exercise are reported in Table 3. I begin by including two interaction 
terms comprising “industry production share in GDP and industry external finance dependence” 
and “industry production share in GDP and industry relational risks vulnerability” in Column 1. 
Column 2 also includes two interaction term variables comprising “inflation rate and industry 
external finance dependence” and “inflation and industry relational risks vulnerability”. In both 
cases, the coefficient estimates of 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡  and 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 continues to be positive and statistically different 
from zero.  
 
Next, Column 3 includes two interaction terms comprising “financial development and industry 
external finance dependence”, and “financial development and industry relational risk 
vulnerability”. The interaction terms are introduced to isolate the effect of social trust that may be 
due to the country’s level of (formal) financial development.7 Column 4 includes two additional 
interaction terms comprising “rule of law indicator and industry external finance dependence”, 
and “rule of law indicator and industry relational risk vulnerability”. This serves to isolate the 
effect of social trust level from picking any effect that may be due to the quality of the domestic 
formal contracting environment. Column 5 includes two additional interaction terms comprising 
“per capita GDP and industry external finance dependence”, and “per capita GDP and industry 
                                                             
7
 Correlation between both variable is 0.35.  
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relational risk vulnerability”. Income per capita is used here as a catch-up all term for the country’s 
level of development. Hence, the included interaction terms serve to isolate the effect of social 
trust that may be due to the overall development level of the country. Column 5 jointly includes 
the interaction terms in Column 3-5. In all the columns, the coefficient estimates of 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 continues to be positive and statistically different from zero, suggesting that external finance 
dependent and relational risks vulnerable industries experience a faster increase in R&D 
investment more in high trusting countries. 
 
<<Table 4>> 
 
3.2.3. Different samples 
This section tests the robustness of the baseline result to changes in changes in the sample. I begin 
by testing whether my result is driven by any particular country in my sample. To this end, I 
estimate twenty different regressions excluding one country at a time. Table 4 reports the result of 
this exercise. Each row represent an independent regression. The Column titled “Country 
excluded” indicate the excluded country while performing the regression. In each case, the 
coefficient estimates of the variables of interest continue to be positive and statistically different 
from zero which are both consistent with the baseline result. Therefore, these results further 
suggest the baseline result is not driven by any specific country effect. It is also reassuring that the 
results are not influenced by the few countries we filled up the missing observations using linear 
interpolations.  
 
<<Table 5>> 
 
Next, I divide my sample into two using the mean year, 1999, as the cut-off and reevaluate the 
effect of social trust on R&D investment. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 report the results for the two 
periods: 1990-1998 and 1999-2008. Secondly, I divide the sample into three non-overlapping 
periods: 1990-1995, 1996-2001, and 2001-2008. Columns 3-5 in Table 5 show the results of this 
exercise. In all cases, the coefficient estimates of 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 continue to be positive and 
statistically different from zero at all conventional levels. These results suggest that the baseline 
result is time-independent.  
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So far, the analysis used panel data. More so, a longer panel data series was achieved by filling in 
some missing observations for the data on R&D. To ensure that the results are neither artefacts of 
the data panel structure nor driven by the few missing observations which were filled-up,8 I 
transform the data into a time-invariant cross-sectional data by taking the sample averages. I 
achieve this in two ways. First, I take the averages of the variables over the periods 1990-2008. 
Secondly, I take the averages of the variables over the periods 1990-2006. Column 3 and 4 report 
the result of this exercise. In both columns, the initial results remain unchanged.  
 
<<Table 6>> 
 
3.2.4. Endogeneity 
Until now, the empirical analysis has been silent about endogeneity issue. This is because I do not 
consider it a concern in my model. As noted in section 3.2.1 and elsewhere (Rajan & Zingales 
1998; Kroszner et al., 2007), the adopted empirical approach reduces potential endogeneity 
problems. Among others, this is due to the battery of industry, country and year fixed effects the 
model allows. In addition, section 3.2.1 controlled for time-varying industry and country factors, 
which further addresses concerns of omitted variable bias. Secondly, while it is clear from the 
analysis that R&D investment is affected by social trust level, it is unlikely that social trust at the 
country level would be affected by R&D investment at the 2-digit industry level. This alleviates 
any concern of reverse causality. A competing argument here would be that through repeated 
interactions, such as R&D collaboration, norms of trust and reciprocity are formed. While this 
argument is compelling, it is still unclear whether this would transform into a nationwide trust. 
Among others, this is because not all R&D activities can impact on social trust, and for those that 
can, they may either build or erode trust (Xie et al., 2019).9 Thirdly, the empirical approach 
adopted in the study traces the R&D investment effect of trust by exploring exogenous variations 
in industry technological components which are interacted with social trust level. Notwithstanding 
these, Table 6 reports the result when contemporaneous values of R&D investment intensities are 
                                                             
8
 In an unreported result, I rerun the regression without filling up the missing observations. I also construct a cross-
sectional data without the filling up the missing observations. In both cases, the baseline result remain unchanged. 
9
 For what it worth, some inter-firm activities that are considered to be born out of trust may be just a mere act of 
calculated self-interest. 
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regressed on a period lagged values of social trust level. As can be seen in the table, the results in 
the columns are consistent with our baseline results. 
 
4. Conclusion 
A growing body of literature now examines the relationship between social trust and innovation. 
This paper extends this literature by evaluating two causal mechanisms, access to external finance 
and reduction in relational risks, through which social trust can influence innovation activities. 
Firstly, high trust level can ease firms’ credit constraints by reducing moral hazards and 
information asymmetries problems that can make raising external capital difficult and expensive 
for firms. Secondly, social trust, as an integral part of a country’s overall contracting environment, 
can reduce relational risks that expose firms to ex-post holdup and/or outright intellectual property 
expropriation. Using industry-level data on R&D investments in 20 OECD countries over the 
period spanning 1990-2008, the paper finds suggestive evidence that high social trust level 
encourages R&D investments. It then tests the two mechanisms within the empirical approach 
developed by Rajan & Zingales (1998) by evaluating whether external finance dependent and 
relational risk vulnerable industries experience higher R&D intensities in countries with high 
social trust level compared with those industries in countries with low social trust level. The results 
provide robust evidence in support of the hypothesis: high social trust level exerts a positive 
influence on innovation activities by expanding access to finance and reducing relational risks.  
 
Existing studies on the relationship between trust and innovation have largely focused on 
innovation outcome using patent count data (Akҫomak & ter Weel, 2009; Kaasa, 2009; Akҫomak 
& Müller-Zick, 2018; Thompson, 2018). Among others, this paper expands this literature by 
suggesting that social trust level leads to improved innovation outcomes, and ultimately economic 
growth, by incentivizing research effort either through easing credit constraints and/or reducing 
relational risks of R&D investing firms. It also contributes to the literature examining the impact 
of trust on investment decisions but has largely focused on investments in human and physical 
capital (Dearmon & Grier, 2009; 2011). Specifically, it provides evidence on the effect of trust on 
R&D investment decision, hence showing another way social trust level can influence the real 
sector of the economy. From a policy perspective, the results underline the importance of informal 
institutions such as social trust in encouraging R&D investment which has been identified as an 
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important component of income per capita and long-run productivity growth (Romer, 1990; 
Grossman & Helpman, 1991; Aghion & Howitt, 1992). Accordingly, it begs the need for 
governments to identify the drivers of social trust and make concerted efforts in investing in them. 
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Table 1 – Social Trust and Investment in R&D: Baseline Regression 
This table evaluates the effect of trust on average investment in R&D, and on external finance dependent and relational risks vulnerable industries 
over the period spanning 1990-2008. The dependent variable in each column is industry R&D investment intensity measured as the ratio of R&D 
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expenditure to value added. Industry external finance dependence (𝑥𝑠)  is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures less cash flow from 
operations over capital expenditures. Industry relational risk vulnerability (𝑟𝑠) 𝑖𝑠 measured as the share of its intermediate inputs that are neither 
traded on organized exchange nor referenced priced in trade journals. Both indexes are computed using data on U.S and they come from Maskus 
et al. (2019) and Seitz & Watzinger (2017), respectively. Industry is defined as the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2. Social trust (𝑇𝑖𝑡) variable is taken from the World Value Survey and is measured as the proportion of a country’s population that “agrees” with the statement, “Most people can be 
trusted”. “ind” is the industry production share in GDP while “lnf” is the country inflation rate. 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 𝑇𝑖𝑡  0.0890 -0.1141 -0.3969 -0.5005 -0.509 
 [0.0236]*** [0.0946] [0.1043]*** [0.1112]*** [0.1178]*** 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 0.5621  0.4996 0.5868 
  [0.1008]*** [0.0884]*** [0.0982]*** 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡  0.8801 0.8355 0.8087 
   [0.1566]*** [0.1491]*** [0.1555]*** 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡 -0.4512 -0.3275 -0.3363 -0.359 -0.1684 
 [0.0715]*** [0.0612]*** [0.0624]*** [0.0647]*** [0.0464]*** 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 -0.0021 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
 [0.0003]*** [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] 𝑥𝑠     -0.1105 
     [0.0306]*** 𝑟𝑠   -0.1308 
     [0.0507]*** 
R-Squared 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.12 
# Observation 6,214 6,214 6,214 6,214 6,214 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. The columns contain unreported year, country 
and industry fixed effects. 
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Table 2 – Social Trust and Investment in R&D: Controlling Additional Variable 
This table tests the robustness of the baseline result to controlling for additional country variables in Panel A, additional industry characteristics in Panel B, and using more stringent time-
varying country and industry fixed effects in Panel C. The dependent variable in each column is industry R&D investment intensity measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to value 
added. Industry external finance dependence (𝑥𝑠)  is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures less cash flow from operations over capital expenditures. Industry relational risk 
vulnerability (𝑟𝑠) 𝑖𝑠 measured as the share of its intermediate inputs that are neither traded on organized exchange nor referenced priced in trade journals. Both indexes are computed using 
data on U.S and they come from Maskus et al. (2019) and Seitz & Watzinger (2017), respectively. Industry is defined as the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2. Social trust (𝑇𝑖𝑡) variable is taken from 
the World Value Survey and is measured as the proportion of a country’s population that “agrees” with the statement, “Most people can be trusted”. “ind” is the industry production share 
in GDP while “lnf” is the country inflation rate. 
 Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4] [5] [6]   [7] [8] [9] 𝑇𝑖𝑡  -0.4977 -0.5341  -0.6172 -0.4218 -0.2213 -0.3723  -0.3353 -0.5175 -0.1699 
 [0.1117]*** [0.1305]*** [0.1384]*** [0.1658]** [0.1135]* [0.1710]** [0.2672] [0.1173]*** [0.7608] 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 0.4981 0.5035  0.3823 0.4692 0.3664 0.288  0.4993 0.516 0.5158 
 [0.0885]*** [0.1036]*** [0.0670]*** [0.1062]*** [0.0800]*** [0.0566]*** [0.0899]*** [0.0915]*** [0.0931]*** 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 0.836 0.7883  0.5865 0.7962 0.6608 0.4757  0.8358 0.8695 0.8698 
 [0.1491]*** [0.1711]*** [0.1166]*** [0.1684]*** [0.1331]*** [0.0855]*** [0.1510]*** [0.1541]*** [0.1561]*** 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 -0.3634 -0.3596  -0.4034 -0.3529 -0.3304 -0.3734  -0.351 -0.3489 -0.3355 
 [0.0654]*** [0.0743]*** [0.0734]*** [0.0659]*** [0.0639]*** [0.0728]*** [0.0671]*** [0.0730]*** [0.0742]*** 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡  -0.0001 0.0011  0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006  0.0075 0.0005 0.0146 
 [0.0004] [0.0007]  [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004]  [0.0219] [0.0004] [0.0666] 
R-Squared 0.19 0.19   0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19   0.22 0.23 0.24 
# Observation 6,172 4,688   6,214 6,214 6,214 6,214   6,214 6,214 6,214 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. Columns 1-6 contain unreported year, country and industry fixed effects. Column 7 contains 
unreported sector and year fixed effects, and time-varying country fixed effects. Column 8 contains unreported country and year fixed effects, and time-varying sector fixed 
effects. Column 7 contains unreported sector and year fixed effects, and time-varying country fixed effects. Column 9 contains unreported year and time-varying country and 
sector fixed effects.  
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Table 3 - Social Trust and Investment in R&D: Distinguishing the effect of Social Trust 
This table tests the robustness of the baseline result by distinguishing the effect of social trust from other industry and country characteristics. 
The dependent variable in each column is industry R&D investment intensity measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to value added. 
Industry external finance dependence (𝑥𝑠)  is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures less cash flow from operations over capital 
expenditures. Industry relational risk vulnerability (𝑟𝑠) 𝑖𝑠 measured as the share of its intermediate inputs that are neither traded on organized 
exchange nor referenced priced in trade journals. Both indexes are computed using data on U.S and they come from Maskus et al. (2019) and 
Seitz & Watzinger (2017), respectively. Industry is defined as the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2. Social trust (𝑇𝑖𝑡) variable is taken from the World Value Survey and is measured as the proportion of a country’s population that “agrees” with the statement, “Most people can be trusted”. 
“ind” is the industry production share in GDP while “lnf” is the country inflation rate. 
 
Industry 
Production 
share in GDP Inflation Rate 
Financial 
Development Rule of Law GDP Pc All 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 𝑇𝑖𝑡  -0.4885 -0.4342 -0.3755 -0.4448 -0.2523 -0.3969 
 [0.1110]*** [0.1106]*** [0.1012]*** [0.1326]*** [0.1151]** [0.1704]** 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 0.4914 0.4543 0.3724 0.4354 0.2859 0.4428 
 [0.0887]*** [0.0910]*** [0.0766]*** [0.1109]*** [0.1043]*** [0.1660]*** 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 0.8167 0.7192 0.6514 0.6533 0.4379 0.552 
 [0.1493]*** [0.1510]*** [0.1287]*** [0.1846]*** [0.1744]** [0.2778]** 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 0.3962 -0.4065 -0.42 -0.3653 -0.4024 -0.375 
 [0.2344]* [0.0648]*** [0.0691]*** [0.0747]*** [0.0647]*** [0.0746]*** 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡  0.0005 0.0052 0.0006 0.0009 0.0005 0.0008 
 [0.0004] [0.0009]*** [0.0004] [0.0005]* [0.0004] [0.0006] 
R-Square 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 
# Observation 6,214 6,214 6,214 4,688 6,214 4,688 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. The columns contain unreported year, country 
and industry fixed effects 
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Table 4 - Social Trust and Investment in R&D: Testing for Country Effect 
This table tests whether the baseline result is driven by a country effect. It tests the robustness of the baseline result by dropping the countries in the 
sample one at a time while regressing the R&D investment intensities on the response variables. The dependent variable in each column is industry 
R&D investment intensity measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to value added. Industry external finance dependence (𝑥𝑠)  is measured as the 
ratio of capital expenditures less cash flow from operations over capital expenditures. Industry relational risk vulnerability (𝑟𝑠) 𝑖𝑠 measured as the 
share of its intermediate inputs that are neither traded on organized exchange nor referenced priced in trade journals. Both indexes are computed 
using data on U.S and they come from Maskus et al. (2019) and Seitz & Watzinger (2017), respectively. Industry is defined as the 3-digit ISIC 
Revision 2. Social trust (𝑇𝑖𝑡) variable is taken from the World Value Survey and is measured as the proportion of a country’s population that “agrees” with the statement, “Most people can be trusted”. “ind” is the industry production share in GDP while “lnf” is the country inflation rate. 
Country 
Excluded 𝑇𝑖𝑡  𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡  R-Squared # Observation 
Austria -0.2856 0.2871 0.4612 -0.1188 -0.0001 0.11 6,005 
 [0.0993]*** [0.0278]*** [0.0432]*** [0.0363]*** [0.0003] 
Belgium -0.2857 0.2854 0.4571 -0.1183 -0.0001 0.11 5,983 
 [0.1002]*** [0.0278]*** [0.0431]*** [0.0380]*** [0.0003] 
Canada -0.2943 0.3004 0.4614 -0.0926 -0.0001 0.11 5,954 
 [0.1027]*** [0.0287]*** [0.0448]*** [0.0359]*** [0.0003] 
Czech Rep. -0.2973 0.2968 0.471 -0.1405 -0.0001 0.11 5,878 
 [0.1000]*** [0.0280]*** [0.0432]*** [0.0395]*** [0.0003] 
Germany -0.2812 0.29 0.4478 -0.1353 -0.0001 0.10 5,836 
 [0.1018]*** [0.0287]*** [0.0444]*** [0.0368]*** [0.0003] 
Spain -0.2858 0.2987 0.4736 -0.1249 -0.0001 0.11 5,836 
 [0.1149]** [0.0286]*** [0.0441]*** [0.0388]*** [0.0003] 
Finland -0.3145 0.2862 0.4989 -0.0957 -0.0001 0.11 5,948 
 [0.1054]*** [0.0285]*** [0.0448]*** [0.0369]*** [0.0003] 
France -0.2733 0.2758 0.4424 -0.1377 -0.0001 0.10 5,836 
 [0.1010]*** [0.0277]*** [0.0430]*** [0.0369]*** [0.0003] 
United King. -0.3087 0.2928 0.4828 -0.1144 -0.0001 0.11 5,980 
 [0.1047]*** [0.0283]*** [0.0442]*** [0.0359]*** [0.0003] 
Greece -0.2597 0.2824 0.4508 -0.1101 0.0003 0.12 5,836 
 [0.0972]*** [0.0274]*** [0.0424]*** [0.0363]*** [0.0003] 
Hungary -0.3008 0.2913 0.476 -0.1285 -0.0001 0.11 5,900 
 [0.1014]*** [0.0277]*** [0.0429]*** [0.0392]*** [0.0004] 
Ireland -0.3022 0.2986 0.4768 -0.0555 -0.0001 0.11 5,890 
 [0.1042]*** [0.0282]*** [0.0442]*** [0.0379] [0.0003] 
Iceland -0.3101 0.2908 0.4881 -0.1422 -0.0001 0.12 5,853 
 [0.0984]*** [0.0275]*** [0.0442]*** [0.0428]*** [0.0003] 
Italy -0.2892 0.2953 0.4634 -0.1119 -0.0001 0.11 5,836 
 [0.1014]*** [0.0284]*** [0.0439]*** [0.0378]*** [0.0003] 
Japan -0.2856 0.2749 0.4661 -0.1084 0.0000 0.1 5,948 
 [0.1008]*** [0.0289]*** [0.0453]*** [0.0358]*** [0.0003] 
Mexico -0.2956 0.2936 0.4729 -0.1249 0.0000 0.11 5,941 
 [0.1086]*** [0.0275]*** [0.0427]*** [0.0380]*** [0.0004] 
Netherlands -0.2508 0.229 0.3488 -0.0824 0.0000 0.13 5,836 
 [0.0621]*** [0.0167]*** [0.0211]*** [0.0293]*** [0.0003] 
Norway -0.2902 0.292 0.4774 -0.1039 -0.0001 0.11 5,976 
 [0.1036]*** [0.0297]*** [0.0469]*** [0.0359]*** [0.0003] 
Poland -0.2943 0.2931 0.4707 -0.1358 -0.0001 0.11 5,920 
 [0.1016]*** [0.0276]*** [0.0426]*** [0.0387]*** [0.0004] 
Portugal -0.3455 0.3069 0.4966 -0.1028 -0.0003 0.13 5,874 
  [0.0976]*** [0.0270]*** [0.0413]*** [0.0375]*** [0.0002] 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. The columns contain unreported year, country 
and industry fixed effects 
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Table 5 - Social Trust and Investment in R&D: Shorter Time Panel and Cross-Sectional Analysis 
This table tests the robustness of the baseline result by breaking the original sample into shorter time periods and a time invariant cross-sectional data. 
The dependent variable in each column is industry R&D investment intensity measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to value added. Industry external 
finance dependence (𝑥𝑠)  is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures less cash flow from operations over capital expenditures. Industry relational 
risk vulnerability (𝑟𝑠) 𝑖𝑠 measured as the share of its intermediate inputs that are neither traded on organized exchange nor referenced priced in trade 
journals. Both indexes are computed using data on U.S and they come from Maskus et al. (2019) and Seitz & Watzinger (2017), respectively. Industry 
is defined as the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2. Social trust (𝑇𝑖𝑡) variable is taken from the World Value Survey and is measured as the proportion of a country’s population that “agrees” with the statement, “Most people can be trusted”. “ind” is the industry production share in GDP while “lnf” is the country 
inflation rate. 
  Shorter Time Panel   Cross-Section 
 [1990-1998] [1999-2008] [1990-1995] [1996-2001] [2001-2008]  [1990-2008] [1990-2006] 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]   [6] [7] 𝑇𝑖𝑡  -0.1384 -0.3172 -0.0895 -0.1767 -0.326  -0.2966 -0.2102 
 [0.1053] [0.1476]** [0.1659] [0.2049] [0.1868]*  [0.0818]*** [0.1644] 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 0.1837 0.3635 0.1481 0.2681 0.3939  0.3552 0.3807 
 [0.0235]*** [0.0431]*** [0.0272]*** [0.0395]*** [0.0553]*** [0.0990]*** [0.1015]*** 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡 0.1765 0.4085 0.1081 0.3497 0.4025  0.2931 0.5624 
 [0.0432]*** [0.0720]*** [0.0524]** [0.0684]*** [0.0915]*** [0.0817]*** [0.1738]*** 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  -0.0884 -0.1659 -0.0755 -0.1387 -0.1711  -0.0073 -0.0439 
 [0.0487]* [0.0551]*** [0.0718] [0.0585]** [0.0695]** [0.1220] [0.1730] 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡  0.0003 0.0013 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0025  -0.053 -0.0054 
 [0.0006] [0.0012] [0.0016] [0.0007] [0.0028]  [0.0220]** [0.0020]*** 
R-Squared 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.13   0.36 0.16 
# Observation 2,601 3,613 1,526 2,230 2,458   227 385 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. The columns contain unreported year, country 
and industry fixed effects 
 
Table 6 - Social Trust and Investment in R&D: Lagged Values of Trust 
This table tests the robustness of the baseline result by regressing R&D investment intensities on a period lagged values of social trust. The 
dependent variable in each column is industry R&D investment intensity measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to value added. Industry 
external finance dependence (𝑥𝑠)  is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures less cash flow from operations over capital expenditures. 
Industry relational risk vulnerability (𝑟𝑠) 𝑖𝑠 measured as the share of its intermediate inputs that are neither traded on organized exchange nor 
referenced priced in trade journals. Both indexes are computed using data on U.S and they come from Maskus et al. (2019) and Seitz & 
Watzinger (2017), respectively. Industry is defined as the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2. Social trust (𝑇𝑖𝑡) variable is taken from the World Value Survey and is measured as the proportion of a country’s population that “agrees” with the statement, “Most people can be trusted”. “ind” is 
the industry production share in GDP while “lnf” is the country inflation rate. 
  [1]   [2]   [3] 𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 -0.1141  -0.3984  -0.5053 
 [0.1226]  [0.1317]*** [0.1379]*** 𝑥𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 0.5697    0.5093 
 [0.1044]***   [0.0919]*** 𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡−1  0.8918  0.8485 
   [0.1635]*** [0.1560]*** 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  -0.3512  -0.3529  -0.3759 
 [0.0643]*** [0.0650]*** [0.0674]*** 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007 
 [0.0005]  [0.0005]  [0.0005] 
R-Squared 0.17   0.18   0.19 
# Observations 5,830   5,830   5,830 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. The columns contain unreported year, country 
and industry fixed effects 
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Appendix 
Table 1A: Summary Statistics 
This table presents basic summary statistics for the main variables employed in the empirical analysis. 
Variable  
# 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max p(25) p(75) 
R&D Intensities (R) 6,305 0.056 0.173 0.000 4.548 0.004 0.048 
Trust (T) 6,311 0.344 0.120 0.100 0.742 0.246 0.417 
Finance Dependence 6,311 0.254 0.253 -0.121 0.944 0.123 0.328 
Contract Dependence 6,311 0.480 0.224 0.070 0.910 0.280 0.690 
Industry Share in GDP 6,215 0.026 0.028 0.000 0.232 0.008 0.032 
Inflation Rate 6,311 4.424 5.357 -0.923 34.999 1.810 4.592 
 
Table 2A: Correlation Matrix 
This table presents correlation matrix for the main variables employed in the empirical analysis  
| 
R&D 
Intensities Trust 
Finance 
Dependence 
Contract 
Dependence 
Industry Share 
in GDP 
Inflation 
Rate  
R&D Intensities 1.000      
Trust 0.079 1.000     
Finance Dependence 0.132 -0.050 1.000    
Contract Dependence 0.193 0.024 0.046 1.000   
Industry Share in GDP -0.065 -0.061 -0.017 -0.175 1.000  
Inflation Rate -0.086 -0.309 0.015 -0.011 0.025 1.000 
 
Table 3A: Basic Country Characteristics 
This table reports basic summary statistics on social trust level and R&D intensities for all countries in the sample 
used in the empirical analysis. 
    Trust   R&D 
Countries # Observations Mean Min Max   Mean Min Max 
Austria 209 0.331 0.303 0.351  0.068 0.002 0.454 
Belgium 231 0.317 0.281 0.351  0.070 0.001 0.504 
Canada 260 0.453 0.388 0.479  0.060 0.000 0.542 
Czech Republic 336 0.268 0.239 0.285  0.025 0.000 0.360 
Germany 378 0.347 0.320 0.378  0.072 0.001 0.487 
Spain 399 0.318 0.200 0.385  0.031 0.000 0.183 
Finland 266 0.564 0.488 0.627  0.032 0.000 0.162 
France 378 0.231 0.188 0.258  0.100 0.000 0.540 
United Kingdom 234 0.365 0.297 0.436  0.085 0.004 0.318 
Greece 378 0.249 0.213 0.276  0.043 0.000 3.688 
Hungary 314 0.243 0.218 0.272  0.010 0.000 0.120 
Ireland 394 0.392 0.358 0.474  0.027 0.000 0.386 
Iceland 361 0.423 0.404 0.437  0.069 0.000 2.600 
Italy 378 0.309 0.277 0.337  0.039 0.000 0.481 
Japan 266 0.417 0.391 0.460  0.113 0.006 0.446 
Mexico 273 0.222 0.156 0.312  0.004 0.000 0.034 
Netherlands 378 0.505 0.450 0.598  0.133 0.000 4.548 
Norway 238 0.659 0.633 0.742  0.072 0.002 0.515 
Poland 294 0.214 0.179 0.247  0.011 0.000 0.073 
Portugal 340 0.168 0.100 0.214  0.059 0.000 1.917 
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Table 4A: Basic Industry Characteristics 
This table presents average industry R&D intensities and industry share in GDP. It also present industry values on contract and Finance 
dependence which are used in the empirical analysis. Data on industry contract dependence comes from Seitz & Watzinger (2017). It is 
measured for each industry as the share of its intermediate inputs that are neither traded on organized exchange nor referenced priced in 
trade journals. Data on industry Finance dependence is from Maskus et al. (2019). It is measured for each industry as the industry’s ratio 
of capital expenditures less cash flow from operations over capital expenditures. Both indexes are computed using data on U.S. 
ISIC  ISIC Description 
RDI 
Intensities 
Industry 
Production 
Share in GDP 
Contract 
Dependence 
External 
Finance 
Dependence 
15 Food products and beverages 0.008 0.104 0.16 0.181 
16 Tobacco products 0.008 0.003 0.20 0.944 
17 Textiles 0.015 0.014 0.46 0.262 
18 Wearing apparel and fur 0.008 0.012 0.28 0.174 
19 Leather, leather products and footwear 0.029 0.006 0.55 0.098 
20 Wood and cork (except furniture) 0.005 0.014 0.45 0.156 
21 Paper and paper products 0.009 0.019 0.50 0.123 
22 Publishing, printing and reprod. of recorded media 0.002 0.026 0.74 0.096 
23 Coke, refined petrol. products and nuclear fuel 0.073 0.028 0.07 -0.044 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0.101 0.053 0.26 0.791 
25 Rubber and plastics products 0.026 0.020 0.29 0.300 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.012 0.022 0.35 -0.121 
27 Basic metals 0.019 0.033 0.25 0.147 
28 Fabricated metal products (exc. mach, and equip.) 0.009 0.032 0.43 0.166 
29 Machinery and equipment nec 0.044 0.040 0.72 0.076 
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 0.232 0.014 0.79 0.502 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus nec 0.081 0.021 0.58 0.137 
32 Radio, TV and communication equipment 0.189 0.021 0.91 0.328 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.105 0.009 0.69 0.643 
34 Motor Vehicles 0.071 0.047 0.70 0.394 
35 Other transport equipment 0.100 0.012 0.58 0.124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
